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BADGES OF OPPORTUNISM: PRINCIPLES
FOR POLICING RESTRUCTURING SUPPORT
AGREEMENTS
Edward J. Janger * & Adam J. Levitin **
ABSTRACT
Bankruptcy is a market for corporate control. Current bankruptcy
practice offers two alternative mechanisms for effectuating changes in
control of a firm: (1) a pre-plan all-asset sale under section 363(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code; or (2) an asset sale or recapitalization pursuant to a
plan of reorganization under section 1129 of the Code. Pre-plan sales
under section 363(b) are fast, but lack the procedural protections
associated with a restructuring or sale pursuant to a plan. Plan
confirmation can be costly and uncertain, however. Restructuring support
agreements (“RSAs”)—contractual agreements to support a future
restructuring that has certain agreed-upon characteristics—appear to offer
a salutary bridge between the efficiencies of a quick sale and the
procedural protections of a plan. RSAs, however, can also facilitate
opportunistic behavior that enable creditors to hold value maximization
hostage to an adjustment in distributional priority.
This Article explores the use of RSAs in corporate control transactions
in bankruptcy. We catalogue the good and bad uses of RSAs. We show how
RSAs can be used to effectuate an “end-run” around the plan process and
identify certain “badges of opportunism” that should serve as red flags for
abusive RSAs. From this we articulate a central norm of Chapter 11,
namely that the common interest in value maximization may not be held
hostage by individual creditors seeking to improve their priority. This
underlying principle provides a general metric for how to distinguish
coordination from opportunism in RSAs.
INTRODUCTION
Business reorganizations are, by definition, a form of corporate control
transaction. When a debtor is insolvent, control is in play along two
different axes. The first axis allocates control within the existing capital
structure. The filing of bankruptcy effectuates a change of control from
equity to debt. 1
*

David M. Barse Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship, Brooklyn
Law School. The Authors wish to thank Maren Eisenmesser for able research assistance and the
Dean’s Research Fund at Brooklyn Law School for generous support of this project. Mistakes are,
of course, ours alone.
**
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1. On the one hand this is an implication of the “absolute priority rule” of 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(B) (2018). It is also a practical effect of the shifting of supervision from the board of
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Second, the company itself is on the auction block, meaning that its
assets, or even the entire firm, may be transferred to a new owner. Outside
investors may wish to buy the company, and the choice among offers
implicates serious governance concerns. In insolvency, the fiduciary duty of
loyalty expands to contemplate creditors as well as shareholders, and this
has distributional consequences. 2 The fiduciary, be it an officer, director,
trustee-in-bankruptcy, or debtor-in-possession, must frequently choose
among buyers, or between sale and recapitalization. These choices may
force the fiduciary to weigh an increased distribution to one group of
creditors against a reduced distribution to another. Unfortunately, principles
of fiduciary duty offer no useful solution to such problems of inherently
divided loyalty.
Bankruptcy law provides a procedure for addressing such choices. The
Chapter 11 plan confirmation process implements a supervised negotiation
with the end-goal of either class acceptance or cramdown. The plan process
encourages the flow of information and facilitates coordination among
stakeholders in the shadow of statutory entitlements. In particular, class
voting and the threat of cramdown minimize the power of holdouts who
might choose to exploit the various forms of situational leverage that attend
insolvency. 3 In this regard, the Bankruptcy Code provides both a
compliment to contract and a backstop to fiduciary duty.
Current bankruptcy practice offers two alternative mechanisms for
effectuating changes of control: (1) a pre-plan all-asset sale under section
363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code; or (2) an asset sale or recapitalization
pursuant to a plan of reorganization under section 1129 of the Code. 4 Preplan sales under section 363(b) are fast, but lack the procedural protections
associated with a restructuring or sale pursuant to a plan. Plan confirmation
can be costly and uncertain; rescuing the business may be frustrated as
claimants jockey for position.
In this Article, we consider restructuring support agreements
(“RSAs”)—contractual agreements among creditors, and sometimes the
debtor, to support restructuring plans that have certain agreed-upon
characteristics. RSAs potentially offer a salutary bridge between the
directors to the creditors’ committee, the court, and other interested parties. This supervision
structure addresses the fact it may not be immediately clear which particular creditor constituency
holds the so-called fulcrum security—the residual claim against the reorganized debtor that will
result in that constituency holding the equity of the reorganized debtor.
2. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’n Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *1155 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“At least where a corporation is operating in the
vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but
owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007). The contributions to this symposium of Henry Hu, Jay
Westbrook, and John Pottow each address this issue.
3. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1122, 1125, 1129 (2018).
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), 1129 (2018).

2018]

Badge of Opportunism

171

efficiencies of a quick sale and the procedural protections of a plan, but they
also pose a potential avenue for abuse of the bankruptcy process.
In our previous work, together and separately, we have explored the
way the Bankruptcy Code deals (and could deal better) with behavior and
coordination problems after the case has been filed.5 In this Article, we
consider the dynamics of control both prior to the bankruptcy filing and
after. We conclude that RSAs are an important tool in the restructuring
toolkit. Indeed, we will suggest that sales or restructurings pursuant to an
RSA and confirmed plan are, in most respects, superior to the alternative—
an all-asset sale under section 363(b). Nonetheless there are reasons for
concern, and we identify these as well.
Opportunism arises on both sides of negotiation in bankruptcy. Debtors
may use the bankruptcy process to delay a creditor’s exercise of its nonbankruptcy rights. 6 But the Bankruptcy Code’s process requirements exist
precisely because creditor opportunism is a concern in insolvency as well. 7
The debtor’s vulnerability (and the vulnerable characteristics of certain
types of creditors) can create opportunities for certain creditors to
overreach. 8
It is well understood that insolvency creates a variety of opportunities
for creditors (and the debtor) to use situational leverage to influence the
allocation of scarce assets. 9 The exercise of such leverage comes in many
forms: secured creditors may foreclose; 10 depositories may engage in
setoff; 11 key suppliers may threaten to stop supplying; 12 landlords can
threaten to evict; unsecured creditors may get judgments and start grabbing
assets; 13 and purchasers may seek to take advantage of a depressed

5. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the
Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (discussing concerns with
all-asset sales in bankruptcy, outside the context of a confirmed plan of reorganization); Edward J.
Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy,
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the effect of derivatives and other hedging devices
on the dynamics of plan confirmation).
6. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 181–90 (2001).
7. Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 611 (2015).
8. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 5, at 862; In re Free Lance-Star Publ’g Co., 512 B.R. 798,
806 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014); In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC, No. 09-11078, 2009 WL 2820610,
at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009).
9. See, e.g., In re The Free Lance-Star Publ’g Co., 512 B.R. at 806; Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt.
LP v. GSO Capital Partners L.P., No. 18 CV 232-LTS-BCM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018).
10. See, e.g., In re Am. Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470, 478 (D. Minn. 1980); Peerless Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 376 S.E.2d 161, 164 (W.Va. 1988).
11. See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (distinguishing a
setoff from an asset-freeze).
12. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2004) (invalidating a so-called
“critical vendor” motion).
13. This is the so-called “race of diligence.” See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 7–19.
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valuation to purchase the company on the cheap. 14 To the extent that the
debtor has value as a going concern, individual creditors may have the
power to hold such going concern value hostage by threatening to force
liquidation. Alternatively, fully secured creditors may prefer a quick
realization on their collateral, because they do not benefit from increasing
the value of the firm.
The Bankruptcy Code seeks to limit these uses of situational leverage in
a number of ways: (1) it stays unilateral creditor action (the automatic stay);
(2) it allows for the unwinding of certain prepetition transfers (avoidance);
(3) it sets a baseline distribution if the firm liquidates, but promises more if
the firm can restructure (the allowed secured claim); (4) it creates a
structured bargaining process that insures adequate information and reduces
the ability of a creditor to holdout in the face of a reorganization plan that is
supported by key creditor constituencies (supermajority acceptance); and
(5) it sets an entitlement baseline if the firm reorganizes (cramdown). 15
Bargaining in bankruptcy and on its threshold is, of course, informed by
these procedural requirements and substantive entitlements, for if a deal is
not reached, then liquidation will ensue.
In recent decades, a number of end-runs have been used to frustrate
these procedural protections and reinstate situational leverage. On the frontend, sales of substantially all of the debtor’s assets under section 363 can
lock in a particular distribution without the protections of the plan process,
either by fixing the value of the debtor on sale, 16 or through the selective
assumption of liabilities by the purchaser. 17 As discussed below, these allasset sales are sometimes effectively mandated by milestones included in
debtor-in-possession financing agreements that are themselves an exercise
of situational leverage. 18
On the back-end, “gift” plans, rights offerings, and structured
dismissals distribute value without complying with the Code’s statutory
priorities. 19 RSAs are a useful tool for aiding the plan process, but they too
must be scrutinized to ensure that they are not being used to further such
14. This is the intuition that animates the absolute priority rule. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. &
Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 442 (1999).
15. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 544, 547, 548, 550, 726, 1129(a), 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129(b) (2018).
16. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063,1069 (2nd Cir. 1983).
17. See Order (I) Authorizing the Sale of Substantially all of the Debtors’ Assets Free and
Clear of All Liens, Claims, Interests, and Encumbrances at 1, In re Chrysler LLC., No. 09-50002,
2009 WL 5131534, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009).
18. Debtors are desperate for liquidity and have little ability to negotiate terms if, as is
frequently the case, substantially all of their assets are already encumbered. In such a situation, the
existing secured creditor(s) have the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it deal that the debtor is
compelled to take in order to even have a shot at a restructuring, and these debtor-in-possession
financing agreements frequently mandate sales or require them if rapid progress is not made
toward plan confirmation.
19. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (gift plans); Czyzewski v. Jevic
Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017) (structured dismissals).
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behavior. Indeed, the Supreme Court raised concerns about such end-runs
in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., where it held that structured
dismissals could not deviate from the Code’s statutory priorities. 20
RSAs are bargains, negotiated in contemplation of, or during, a
bankruptcy case. In an RSA, key creditors commit to support the debtor’s
proposed plan of reorganization, provided that the plan satisfies certain
broad characteristics. This allows the debtor to gather support for the
business plan and distributional scheme it wishes to implement through
Chapter 11 prior to the formal disclosure and solicitation process.
Sometimes cases with RSAs are referred to as “prearranged” or
“prenegotiated.” As such, RSAs allow the debtor and key creditors to
overcome coordination problems and to reorganize in the face of (and in
anticipation of) holdouts.
Prearranged bankruptcies differ from so-called “prepackaged”
bankruptcies in that actual votes on a plan are not solicited. Instead, in a
prearranged bankruptcy, certain creditors commit to supporting a plan by
signing onto an RSA proposed by the debtor. 21
RSAs are structured as agreements among the creditors; the prepetition
debtor may or may not be a party. If so, then sometimes (but not always),
the debtor may seek to assume the agreement once the petition is filed. In
most cases, RSAs are subject to a so-called “fiduciary out” provision that
allows the debtor to exit the arrangement if a superior deal presents itself.22
Viewed this way, RSAs appear harmless. Indeed, they seem a relatively
transparent mechanism for bringing order to a complex and difficult
situation.
There is concern, however, that RSAs might be used opportunistically,
to exploit situational leverage in order to reallocate value and thus favor one
investor constituency over others. Indeed, the fact that RSAs are sometimes
referred to as “lockup” agreements highlights this concern. 23 Once an RSA
is proposed and supported by key constituencies, the costs of opposing the
contemplated plan are prohibitive for most creditors. The proposal may
operate as a fait accompli. If the RSA freight train is being used to stop
20. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (“[T]he distributions at issue here more closely resemble proposed
transactions that lower courts have refused to allow on the ground that they circumvent the Code’s
procedural safeguards.”).
21. John D. Ayer et al., Out-of-court Workouts Prepacks and Pre-arranged Cases A Primer,
AM. BANKR. INSTIT. J. (Apr. 1, 2005), available at https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/out-of-courtworkouts-prepacks-and-pre-arranged-cases-a-primer.
22. Morris Massel, How To Negotiate A Ch. 11 Plan Support Agreement, LAW360 (Oct. 16,
2013,
4:37
PM),
https://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existingcontent/publications/pub1651.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
23. See Doron P. Kenter, No Soliciting? Delaware Court Holds that Restructuring Support
Agreement Does Not Constitute Premature Solicitation Warranting Designation of Votes, WEIL
GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP BANKR. BLOG (Feb. 13, 2013), https://business-financerestructuring.weil.com/chapter-11-plans/no-soliciting-delaware-court-holds-that-restructuringsupport-agreement-does-not-constitute-premature-solicitation-warranting-designation-of-votes/.
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creditors from developing information or identifying bases for objection,
the device becomes problematic.
The difficulty is distinguishing beneficial RSAs from harmful ones. In
that regard, we seek to articulate a set of principles for distinguishing one
from the other. Accordingly, we suggest a number of “badges of
opportunism”—red flags in an RSA that act much like the “badges of
fraud,” that are used to identify fraudulent transfers. 24 We also suggest a
procedural device for helping to sort among RSAs. Finally, we compare
RSAs to all-asset sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Because
RSAs contemplate a confirmed plan, we view them as broadly preferable to
sales under section 363. However, as noted below, the distinction is often
not quite as clear as one might like. Nonetheless, we are able to articulate
what we see as a fundamental norm of chapter 11 that guides RSAs, sales,
and a range of other transactions: the common interest in value
maximization may not be held hostage by a creditor seeking to improve its
own priority.
This Article is divided into five parts. First, we describe the practice
surrounding restructuring support agreements and identify some of the
anecdotal concerns raised. Second, we catalogue the good and bad in RSAs.
Third, we offer some examples that illustrate how to distinguish the good
from the bad by focusing on bargaining in the shadow of entitlements. We
link RSAs to the lesson of Jevic, which cautions against “end-runs” around
the plan process. 25 Fourth, we flesh out the concept of an end-run around
the plan process in the context of an RSA and identify certain “badges of
opportunism.” Specifically, we are concerned with provisions in an RSA
that hold value maximization hostage to a reordered priority scheme.
Finally, we consider corporate control transactions in bankruptcy in light of
this analysis. The guiding principle, we suggest, in evaluating corporate
control transactions in bankruptcy should be to prevent a reordering of
priorities through the threat of value destruction.
I. WHAT ARE RESTRUCTURING SUPPORT AGREEMENTS?
It is well understood that the success of a Chapter 11 restructuring is
often dependent on the extent to which it is preplanned. It is difficult for a
firm that “free falls” into bankruptcy to confirm a plan that continues the
business. Planning helps. If the debtor can pre-vet its proposed plan for
exiting bankruptcy with key creditor constituencies, the likelihood of a
successful outcome increases. 26 There is a spectrum of planning possible,
24. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT § 4(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
25. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017) (“[T]he distributions at

issue here more closely resemble proposed transactions that lower courts have refused to allow on
the ground that they circumvent the Code’s procedural safeguards.”).
26. Compare Lehman Brothers, which stumbled into bankruptcy when the Federal Reserve
Bank declined to bail it out, Anne Sraders, The Lehman Brothers Collapse and How It’s Changed
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from a mere proposal to a “prearranged” case to a “prepackaged” case. A
prepackaged case involves a formal and binding solicitation of creditor
votes prior to filing. The debtor files for bankruptcy only after it has
procured votes from the requisite majorities in each impaired class
necessary to confirm the plan. Plan confirmation can then be expedited, and
the case can be completed quickly.
In contrast, a prearranged case involves a lesser degree of creditor buyin. In a prearranged case, key creditor constituencies agree only to support a
plan that meets certain characteristics. They do not sign off on an actual
plan (for no actual plan yet exists), and their votes are not formally
solicited.
The device by which prearrangement is achieved is through a so-called
Restructuring Support Agreement or RSA, that is sometimes also called a
“Plan Support Agreement” or PSA. 27 The agreement may be solely among
key creditor constituencies, or it may include the debtor as a party. If the
debtor is a party, then after filing the debtor may formally “assume” the
agreement under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code or, in the alternative,
will simply perform it without assumption, even if it could not be formally
held to performance. RSAs are entered into both prepetition and postpetition.
There is nothing intrinsically problematic with an RSA, so long as:
(1) the debtor does not commit to do anything that it does not (or
should not) have the power to do; and
(2) the agreement is not used in order to undercut the substantive
polices and procedural protections of the Bankruptcy Code.
In fact, RSAs can be quite helpful. If a debtor has sought to restructure
outside of bankruptcy, but has failed due to the stubbornness of a holdout or
a few holdouts, the Bankruptcy Code’s class voting mechanism and
cramdown procedure can both bind dissidents to the restructuring, as can
the cram-up technique of disenfranchising a holdout by leaving it

The
Economy
Today,
THE
ST.
(Sept.
12,
2018),
https://www.thestre
et.com/markets/bankruptcy/lehman-brothers-collapse-14703153, with Order (I) Authorizing the
Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Interests, and
Encumbrances, (II) Authorizing the Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts
and Unexpired Leases in Connection Therewith and Related Procedures and (III) Granting
Related Relief, In re Chrysler LLC., No. 09-500002, 2009 WL 5131534, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 2009) (demonstrating the debtor entered bankruptcy with a clear idea of how it planned to
emerge).
27. See, e.g., In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc. 533 B.R 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015),
rev’d on other grounds, 808 F.3d 1186 (7th Cir. 2015). In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 442 B.R. 227,
235 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., 513 B.R. 233, 239 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 292 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013);
Memorandum Opinion Approving the Plan Support Agreement, In re Residential Capital, LLC,
12-12020, 2013 WL 3286198, at *20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013), In re Kellogg Square
P’ship, 160 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
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unimpaired. 28 But the work done prepetition should not be lost. There is
certainly nothing to be gained by reinventing the wheel. So, to the extent
that key creditors have signed off on the outlines of a restructuring
prepetition, the RSA allows the debtor to carry that support into
bankruptcy. 29
RSAs present risks, however. When a debtor is in financial difficulty,
negotiations with creditors outside of bankruptcy (or early in the case) can
be highly dysfunctional. 30 Certain key creditors may exploit transactional or
situational leverage to enhance their distribution at the expense of others. 31
A central goal of bankruptcy is, therefore, to try to separate questions of
value maximization from questions of value distribution. Where value
distribution is involved, the Code imposes several procedural requirements
that both preserve the integrity of the negotiations and assure proper flow of
information to stakeholders. Where RSAs further the goals of this process
they are beneficial. Where they seek to short circuit it, they are not.
II. THE GOOD AND THE BAD OF RSAS
A. THE GOOD
When a debtor is insolvent and has multiple creditors, it can be
devilishly difficult to negotiate a workout. 32 In the absence of the ability to
impose forbearance (a stay) and discharge, each creditor has the power to
frustrate the agreement and an incentive to do so. Public choice theorists
have long understood that attempts to divide a fixed pot of money are
subject to a prisoner’s dilemma. 33 Each individual creditor has an incentive
to frustrate the agreement and grab all the reorganization value for
themselves, but if this happens synergistic value of the firm may be lost.
The Bankruptcy Code introduces five features (noted above) to
counteract this dynamic: (1) the automatic stay; 34 (2) the ability to avoid
28. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 (2018).
29. It is important that the support be obtained based on adequate information. In this regard,

the securities laws may impose some discipline before filing the petition, and 11 U.S.C. § 1125
(2018) may do so after.
30. See In re Fisker Auto Holdings, Inc., 510 B.R. 55, 60–61 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014); In re Free
Lance-Star Publ’g Co., 512 B.R. 798, 805 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014); In re Humboldt Creamery,
LLC, No. 09-11078, 2009 WL 2820610, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009).
31. Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP v. GSO Capital Partners L.P., No. 18 CV 232-LTS-BCM, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13961, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2018) (noting that bonds refinance on
favorable terms in return for a payment default that constituted a “Credit Event” under certain
credit default swaps).
32. M. MORITZ & B SEAMAN, GOING FOR BROKE: THE CHRYSLER STORY Ch. 13 (1981).
33. See generally KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR,
AND INSTITUTIONS (2d. ed. 2010) (explaining the idea about empty core and the divide of the
dollars claim); see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648,
687 (2010).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018).
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certain prepetition transfers; 35 (3) a structured bargaining process that
insures adequate information; 36 (4) the power to bind minority holdouts
pursuant to a consensual plan; 37 and (5) the establishment of an entitlement
baseline 38 for all creditors. The goal is to facilitate and structure the
negotiations over the reorganization surplus and deprive individual
creditors of the ability to unilaterally frustrate a favorable deal.
RSAs allow the debtor to bargain in the shadow of liquidation or
cramdown toward a consensual confirmation. Such bargaining can occur
pre-filing, post-filing or both. 39 An RSA can have important positive effects
on prebankruptcy negotiations. It may forestall the race of diligence and
make it more possible to negotiate a restructuring outside of bankruptcy.
Indeed, it may provide the same “breathing period” created by the
automatic stay without the need to file for bankruptcy, reducing holdout
leverage even before the filing.
While RSAs are negotiated without the procedural protections
associated with the plan process and may involve fewer than all of the
interested parties, RSAs do not necessarily foreclose or preclude the usual
procedural protections associate with the plan process. RSAs typically
contain a “fiduciary out” provision, under which the debtor may exit the
agreement if a more favorable offer arises. Moreover, the plan will
ultimately be subjected to judicial approval, following the usual rules for
disclosure, solicitation, and class voting.
B. THE BAD—OR, AT LEAST, WORRISOME
Just as the RSA may allow the debtor to carry some of the benefits of
bankruptcy into a prebankruptcy negotiation, and may facilitate bargaining
within bankruptcy, the RSA may allow a creditor to carry its prebankruptcy
leverage into the bankruptcy case. This is where RSAs can become
troubling and troublesome.
1. Participation and the Fait Accompli
First, as noted above, the negotiation of RSAs can take place in a
multilateral or a bilateral environment, or a combination. This means that
the agreement of key constituencies can be procured first, and then the
agreement can be presented to less powerful constituencies as a fait

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548 (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018).
Order, In re NII Holdings Co. Inc., No. 02-11505 (Oct. 25, 2002) ECF No. 367; Order
Confirming Debtor’s Second Amended Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code at 7, In re Stations Holdings Corp., No. 02-10882(MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Sept.
30, 2002), ECF No. 178.
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accompli, leaving them little choice but to accept. 40 Indeed, it is not
unknown for adherence to the RSA to be procured through an offer that
imposes differential (“deathtrap”) treatment on those who reject. 41 This was
an issue raised in the Caesars Entertainment 42 bankruptcy among others.
Some of these concerns are remedied where it is anticipated that the
case will be completed through a confirmed plan of reorganization, or a sale
pursuant to a plan. In those cases, the bankruptcy court is given an
opportunity to police notice, ensure the adequacy of information, and
consider objections. These objections may address whether the plan was
proposed in good faith, whether the votes were cast in good faith, and
whether any discriminatory treatment proposed in the plan can pass muster.
2. Information/Timing
RSAs also raise concerns about information and timing. When support
is sought prepetition, the debtor and key proponents of the plan often hold
all of the informational cards about the business. The debtor has been
operating the company. If there is a purchaser, they may have had months
to perform due diligence. The creditors whose support is sought are at a
considerable disadvantage. A post-petition solicitation of votes requires the
dissemination of a disclosure statement to the voting stakeholders.43 The
Bankruptcy Code forbids the dissemination of a disclosure statement,
however, unless a court to has first found that it contains “adequate
information.” 44 There is no prepetition equivalent requirement for
disclosures of any sort, much less a merit regulation regime of disclosures.
At best, the adequacy of prepetition disclosure is policed ex post by federal
and state securities laws (when a security is involved), unfair and deceptive
acts and practices statutes, and common law fraud.
While bankruptcy courts actively supervise disclosure, prepetition
negotiations do not benefit from this leveling of the informational playing
field. In this regard, RSAs should be subject to termination if there is a
material change, or information provided turns out to be inaccurate or
incomplete. Indeed, when an RSA is negotiated post-petition, it is important
that the term sheet not cross the line into the solicitation of a vote, 45 and

40. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
1597 (2018) (describing similar tactics in out-of-court bond restructurings).
41. Massel, supra note 22.
42. Sujeet Indap, What happens in Vegas...the messy bankruptcy of Caesars Entertainment,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://on.ft.com/2jYu8PD; Joseph Checkler & Tom Corrigan, Judge
Approves LightSquared’s Restructuring Proposal, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015, 5:16 PM),
https://on.wsj.com/2tl1hGZ.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2018).
44. Id.
45. See In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 293 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013); Century
Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of New York, 860 F.2d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 1988).
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even more important that it not displace the protections associated with the
disclosure and solicitation process. 46
The timing of negotiations can also have a coercive effect. 47 Insolvency
always imposes time pressure, but the debtor and key plan proponents have
power over the timing of the bankruptcy filing. 48 As Jacoby and Janger
discuss, debtors are often melting ice cubes, and crisis timing can be used as
leverage to coerce agreements that violate Code priorities or lock in a
sweetheart deal. 49 RSAs can accomplish such a lock in, as can debtor-inpossession financing agreements.
3. Distribution
Any bankruptcy case must address both value maximization and value
distribution. The Bankruptcy Code seeks to give management a breathing
spell to fix the business or to sell it as a going concern at a fair price.
Insolvency creates a crisis that can force liquidation at a fire sale price.50
The Bankruptcy Code seeks to relieve this crisis pressure so that an
appropriate decision can be made about how to maximize value: is the firm
worth more as a going concern or piecemeal? Are the assets worth more
when placed in a new capital structure or through a rejiggering of the
existing capital structure?
The Bankruptcy Code also creates a structured process for negotiating a
fair distribution of value in the shadow of statutory entitlements. 51 The
process of plan negotiation offers non-consenting creditors procedural
protections as a condition of imposing a haircut. 52 Any technique that
allows a creditor to use situational crisis leverage created by insolvency to
bind the debtor or other creditors after the petition is filed is a danger. In
bankruptcy, there are rules for soliciting votes.53 Outside of bankruptcy,
those protections are much weaker. For companies with registered
securities, federal securities laws come into play, but for non-public
companies, there are often effectively no laws governing the solicitation of
consents. 54
46.
47.
48.
49.

11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018); Jacoby & Janger, supra note 5, at 896.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 867; Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J.
1739, 1742 (1994).
50. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (2007) (noting that recoveries in restructurings exceed those in going concern sales).
51. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 976–77 (2017).
52. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129 (2018).
53. Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of New York, 860 F.2d 94, 97 (3d Cir. 1988).
54. The protections lie in the disclosure regulations contained in the 1933 and 1934 Act.
Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2019); 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2018). State blue sky laws
sometimes have broader definitions of security than federal law and may, therefore, cover some
prepetition solicitations of votes. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (2015) (defining
security as including, among other things, “promissory notes,” “evidences of indebtedness,” “any
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4. The Inadequacy of the Fiduciary Out
A common mechanism for guarding against these concerns is the socalled “fiduciary out” clause. 55 Where a deal is being approved, the debtor’s
support is subject to “higher and better.” In other words, if a better deal
comes along, the debtor can terminate the RSA. This is an important
protection, but it is inadequate. The problem lies in defining “better.” As
Professors Hu and Westbrook have pointed out, fiduciary duties are not
particularly helpful in insolvency. 56 When a debtor is insolvent, or in the
zone of insolvency, officers and directors serve two masters. They may, but
are not required to, consider both shareholder interests and creditor
interests. 57 If the debtor is actually insolvent, the problem becomes even
more acute. Multiple tranches of investors, and often multiple asset-based
or entity based distributional waterfalls come into play. The fiduciary may
seek to maximize the value of the firm (a higher-value offer), but if
achieving the best price carries different distributional consequences, the
fiduciary is not in any position to decide whether one offer is actually better
than another.
Also, most firms are structured as multi-entity corporate groups. Some
or all of the members of the group will typically file together and have their
cases jointly administered. Questions arise as to whether separate plans,
each with separate disclosure, solicitation and voting are necessary.
Similarly, there are questions of whether intercompany claims should be
subordinated or waived, or whether the entities should be substantively
consolidated for voting or distributional purposes. In these cases, a
fiduciary is not serving just two masters, but a host of them, a situation
similar to the “tranche warfare” dilemma for securitization trustees
considering the restructuring of securitized assets. 58 The debtor-fiduciary
essentially faces a centrifuge, in which its duties are simultaneously pulling
it in all directions.
The debtor-fiduciary’s centrifugal problem is particularly acute where
there is a dispute between secured creditors who have priority in assets, and
agreement evidencing a promise or an agreement to pay money,” “warehouse receipts for
intoxicating liquor,” and “the currency of any government other than that of the United States and
Canada”).
55. William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an Anomalous
Concept, 55 BUS. L. 653, 653 (2000).
56. See generally Henry T. C. & Jay Lawrence Westbook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2007).
57. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 WL 277613, at
*1155 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007).
58. See, e.g., Robert J. Coughlin & Ripley E. Hastings, Survival Skills Amid the Rubble: Life
as a Trustee in a Market Collapse, 16 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 37, 42 (2010). A related problem is
when a securitization trustee is trustee for multiple securitization trusts that each have put back
claims against a securitization sponsor. The trusts have adverse interest to each other as they are
competing for the sponsor’s finite pool of assets.
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general unsecured creditors who have a claim against the residual value of
the firm. A sale of a specific asset will lock in the asset’s value, which is in
the interest of a creditor secured by that collateral, but it may also destroy
the firm’s going concern value to the detriment of the general unsecured
creditors. 59
This is problematic. While secured creditors are often colloquially
thought of as “senior” to unsecured creditors, their priority rights are, in
fact, limited to their collateral; they have no general security in the “value”
of the firm as an operating entity. If a secured creditor’s collateral turns out
to be inadequate to repay its debt, that creditor’s deficiency claim is treated
as a general unsecured claim. In such a situation the creditor’s interest in
maximizing (or at least locking in) the value of the collateral-based
distribution may be in tension with the interest of the unsecured creditors in
maximizing the value of the firm. Worse yet, it is possible that an offer may
come along that increases the overall value of the firm but allocates all of
the increase to the secured creditors, or actually reduces the recovery to the
unsecured (or vice versa). There is no obvious way for a debtor-fiduciary to
navigate this thicket.
All of this is to say that when the debtor is a fiduciary for these
disparate interests, the conflicts are inherent, and there is no obvious right
solution. The “fiduciary out” is, therefore, an inadequate solution to the
risks posed by RSAs.
5. RSAs and the Problem of Procedural End-Runs
RSAs, thus, exist in a world where fiduciary duties will not effectively
guide the debtor in making distributional choices and where judges are not
in a position to intervene. Therefore, RSAs must be viewed against the
backdrop of the plan confirmation process. The basic intuition behind the
section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, is that a plan of reorganization can be
confirmed if it complies with certain statutory entitlements: (1) secured
creditors receive the value of their liens; and (2) unsecured creditors receive
the unencumbered value of the firm according to the statutory priority
waterfall.60 If the debtor and the creditors wish to deviate from these
entitlements, they must comply with the procedures for consensual
confirmation of a plan. 61 These include disclosure requirements, voting
procedures, and, ultimately the requirement of the consent to the plan of
statutory majorities of all impaired classes of creditors. 62

59. For this reason, courts will not lift the stay in bankruptcy to sell an asset that is essential to
reorganization, even if the liens against it exceed its value. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (2018).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018).
61. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129(a) (2018).
62. Id.
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The Supreme Court has recently raised concerns about devices that use
procedural shortcuts to evade this structure. In Jevic, 63 a debtor proposed a
so-called “structured dismissal” under which the debtor would, in effect,
settle a case, but then pursuant to the dismissal order distribute funds in a
manner that deviated from the prescribed statutory waterfall for a
liquidation or cramdown plan. 64 Specifically, the litigant specified that
priority wage claimants would not receive a distribution, while unsecured,
non-priority, creditors would. 65 While deviations from statutory (sometimes
called “absolute”) priority are permitted under a consensual plan, they are
not permitted in cramdown. 66 The Supreme Court held that the structural
dismissal device could not be used as an end-run around the plan
confirmation process. 67
The Court noted that there are numerous decisions made during the
course of a bankruptcy case that affect distribution, from asset sales, to
motions to pay certain critical vendors, to curing defaults under assumed
contracts. 68 The permissible examples given were all approved without
objection, or where deviation was found to benefit the estate as a whole.
The Court was careful to distinguish such situations that could be justified
by mere “sufficient reasons,” and cautioned against devices that operate as
sub rosa plans absent a “significant offsetting bankruptcy-related
justification.” 69
RSAs are preferable to most of these devices in that they contemplate a
plan of reorganization that will be subjected to the full panoply of
procedural protections and approved by the requisite majorities. RSAs,
however, are also sometimes referred to colloquially as “lockup”
agreements. In that regard, RSAs can also be used to end-run the plan
process and, as such, raise concerns.
III. USE OF RSAS TO END-RUN THE PLAN PROCESS
A number of recent cases provide examples of controversial uses of
RSAs, and how courts have dealt with them. The concerns have involved:
(1) RSAs as solicitations; (2) coercive features within RSAs; and (3)
milestones (in particular when linked to section 363 sales).
A. SOLICITATIONS
The first area of concern is the need to safeguard the voting procedures
contemplated by the plan confirmation process. Two Delaware bankruptcy
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 973 (2017).
Id. at 976.
Id. at 981.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(B)(ii) (2018).
Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
Id. at 985–86.
Id.
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cases have raised concerns about RSAs entered into post-petition. In 2002,
in both NH Holdings and Stations Holding, the bankruptcy court designated
(that is disqualified) the votes of creditors who had signed on to a postpetition RSA for having improperly solicited votes on a plan. 70 The court
saw the solicitation of signatures to an RSA, promising to support the plan,
as tantamount to solicitation of votes for the plan. This risk of designation
creates a difficult tension between prepackaged plans, where votes are
solicited prepetition, regulated (if at all) by the securities laws, and the rules
governing negotiations prior to and within bankruptcy over a plan.
A more recent case out of Delaware, sought to manage that tension by
construing the definition of solicitation narrowly. In Indianapolis Downs, 71
the court looked to an earlier Third Circuit case, Century Glove, 72 that
limited the prohibition on solicitations to actual solicitations. The court
recognized that the sine qua non of Chapter 11 is negotiation; the debtor
needs the freedom to seek support for its proposed plan without risking vote
designation.
That said, there remains considerable uncertainty about when seeking
an expression of support shades into solicitation of a vote, and when the
RSA crosses the line from term sheet to lock up or sub rosa plan. When
does an RSA cross the line from serving the purposes of Chapter 11 to
frustrating them? The key here seems to be the existence of meaningful
escape hatches, such as fiduciary out provisions (that run to all the
signatories, not just the debtor), as well as “no material modification”
provisions that allow signatories to exit if a better deal appears or if
projections on which the RSA is predicated turn out to be inaccurate. It is
also important that the RSA be structured in such a way that, at the time of
voting, the signatories will have a meaningful choice to make. 73
B. COERCIVE FEATURES
A second possible “end-run” around the confirmation process arises
through the use of coercive features in securing plan support. One way of
doing this is to offer creditors who vote in favor of the plan better treatment
than those who reject it. This technique was at issue in two recent and
prominent cases, Caesars Entertainment, 74 in the Southern District of New
York, and Marblegate 75 in the Second Circuit. In those cases, non70. See, e.g., In re NH Holdings, Inc., 288 B.R. 356, 362 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (designating
votes cast under lock-up agreement executed postpetition); In re Stations Holding Corp., No. 0210881(MFW), 2002 WL 31947022, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 30, 2002).
71. In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 294 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).
72. Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of New York, 860 F.2d 94, 101–03 (3d Cir. 1988).
73. As we will discuss below, this may be because, in the case of a sale, assets have not yet
been distributed, or because the business remains intact.
74. MeehanCombs Global Credit Opportunities Funds, LP v. Caesars Entt Corp., 80 F. Supp.
3d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
75. Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Fin. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017).
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bankruptcy restructurings granted bondholders who tendered their bonds
into the restructuring a distribution, while leaving the non-tendering
bondholders their unimpaired rights against bonds that were rendered
worthless. 76 This practice was challenged under section 316(b) of the Trust
Indenture Act (TIA), but the Second Circuit held that, so long as the core
payment terms of the bonds were left unchanged, the TIA was not
violated. 77 The Second Circuit pointed out that some of the things done to
effectuate the practical impairment might be challenged under other bodies
of law, but not the TIA. 78
While the transactions in both Marblegate and Caesars occurred
outside of bankruptcy, they still involved the use of a restructuring
agreement, and can be understood as analogous to the bankruptcy RSA
issue. The concern here is the use of a coercive exchange offer to
effectively force bondholders to join in the RSA and accept the plan. A
creditor who votes to reject a proposed plan of reorganization always faces
the risk that the failure of its class to accept the plan will force the debtor to
liquidate and that it will therefore receive less. These coercive terms
magnify that effect. The question for us is whether such coercive techniques
should be used in an RSA. It is one thing for the bondholders to agree to a
particular treatment. It is another for them to be levered into it at the RSA
stage, thereby rendering the plan process irrelevant.
C. MILESTONES
There is a separate aspect of the RSA that can be both helpful and
problematic. RSAs are usually thought of as focusing on the content of the
plan and actions to be taken by the debtor post-confirmation. RSAs,
however, can also govern the conduct of the debtor during the case, on the
way to confirmation. Like DIP financing agreements, RSAs frequently
contain “milestones” which require the debtor to achieve certain points in
the restructuring by certain deadlines. In RSAs, if the milestones are
missed, then either the signatories are excused from supporting the plan, or
the debtor commits to an alternative course of action. As a result,
milestones can assure that the proposed business plan progresses toward
consummation. But milestones can also lock in a fait accompli, assuring
that by the time of confirmation there is no meaningful alternative.
An example of a troublesome use of milestones in an RSA can be found
in the Walter Energy case. 79 In that case the RSA provided for a debt to

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16–17.
In re Walter Energy, Inc., 542 B.R. 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015), aff’d sub nom. United
Mine Workers of Am. Combined Benefit Fund v. Walter Energy, Inc., 551 B.R. 631 (N.D. Ala.
2016), and aff’d sub nom. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Plan & Tr. v. Walter
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equity swap that would have given the secured creditors control of the
company. 80 The RSA also provided for a seven month drop dead date,
under which, if the plan was not consummated, there would be a section
363 sale of the company, where the first lien lenders would credit bid their
debt and purchase the company. 81 When the debtor sought to assume the
RSA, numerous creditors objected and the deal fell apart, but this is a rather
extreme example of a creditor’s attempt to use an RSA to lock up the
case. 82
By contrast, Indianapolis Downs 83 contained a less troublesome use of
milestones. It provided an opportunity for the debtor to test the market and
shop the company. If that failed, it provided an outline for a
recapitalization. The effect of this structure was to, in effect, set a reserve
price for an auction of the company. As one of us has discussed
elsewhere, 84 such auctions can have similar lock-up and bid chilling
features, but here a successful outside bid was received. While there may
have been other issues with the Indianapolis Downs RSA, the milestone
here does not appear to have been a problem.
In sum, the issue with milestones is not the milestones themselves, but
whether they are being used as to accomplish an end-run around the plan
confirmation process.
IV. END-RUNS: SUB ROSA PLANS AND THE BADGES OF
OPPORTUNISM
Thus far we have seen that the concerns about RSAs do not lie in the
RSAs themselves, but in how they are being used. It remains unclear
whether RSAs are being used as an aid to or a substitute for plan
confirmation. It remains unclear whether RSAs facilitate bargaining in the
shadow of liquidation or cram-down, or if it they effectuate a transfer of
reorganization surplus to a particular constituency without meaningful
review.
The key question in thinking about RSAs, and the dividing line between
the good and the bad, is whether an RSA is being used to overcome
coordination problems, or whether it is being used to exploit situational
leverage in order to hold the resolution of value maximization issues
hostage to redistributional demands. Is an RSA facilitating the bargaining in
the shadow of entitlement that the Bankruptcy Code contemplates? Or is it
facilitating opportunistic distortion of the Code’s priority scheme or process
Energy, Inc., 579 B.R. 603 (N.D. Ala. 2016), aff’d sub nom. In re Walter Energy, Inc., 911 F.3d
1121 (11th Cir. 2018).
80. Id. at 869.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC,486 B.R. 286, 294 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).
84. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 5, at 867.
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for policing bargains through plan confirmation? We suggest some “badges
of opportunism” that can be used as a rubric for identifying when RSAs are
problematic.
The badges of opportunism come in two flavors, procedural and
distributive, though the two are often linked. On the distributive side, a
clear sign of opportunism is when an RSA is used to reallocate
reorganization surplus to its supporters. Thus, certain provisions in an RSA
such as those that waive preference or fraudulent conveyance recoveries,
that release third parties, that waive section 506(c) charges, or that enforce
structural subordinations, should send up red flags as badges of
opportunism.
On the procedural side, badges of opportunism are present in provisions
that:
(1) reward the signer of the RSA at the expense of non-signers,
particularly where the non-signers are in the same class or a junior
class (unless disinterested members of the junior class also support
the plan); or
(2) seek to commit parties to supporting a plan notwithstanding later
developments in the case.
Thus, the absence of a fiduciary out or a no-material modification
provision might be fatal. Similarly, coercive features, such as those used in
Caesars and Marblegate, ought to be carefully scrutinized with an eye
toward whether they are being used in good faith.
Finally, and this bears particular mention, where an RSA provides for a
sale of the company, the distributive and procedural concerns are magnified
because the sale will be accomplished well before the plan process—the
Bankruptcy Code’s contemplated mechanism for policing bargains—can be
completed. Therefore, the distributive questions in a sale should be subject
to the procedural protections associated with the plan process or the
equivalent.
Janger and Jacoby have described a relatively straightforward way to
accomplish this—the Ice Cube Bond, described below. 85 If there is to be a
sale of substantially all the debtor’s assets outside the context of a
confirmed plan, sufficient assets should be retained in the estate to assure
that any distribution will satisfy the statutory requirements for
“cramdown.” 86
There are two distinct ways that an RSA can be used to facilitate a sale
that is an end-run around the plan process. First, the RSA can simply
contemplate a sale of the firm under Section 363. This approach appears
relatively rare, although nothing prevents it. Second, the RSA could use
milestones that, while contemplating a plan on paper, are really being used
85. See generally Jacoby & Janger, supra note 5 (describing the Ice Cube Bond).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018).

2018]

Badge of Opportunism

187

to get approval of a 363 sale to a stalking horse or credit bidding lender.
This might occur where the contemplated plan is a Hail Mary, or where the
sale contemplated by the termination event contains a prearranged
distribution or strike price or agreed credit bid.
In effect, the RSA may call upon the creditor to support a sale of
substantially all of the assets of the debtor under section 363(b) of the
Code. 87 In such cases, the value of the firm can be distributed pursuant to
the sale order without the procedural protections associated with plan
confirmation, including the assumption of select liabilities that are
effectively elevated in priority by their assumption. 88 Such sales have been
challenged as sub rosa plans, in that the terms of the sale dictate the
distribution to the various creditor constituencies without complying with
the procedural protections associated with confirmation of a consensual
plan of reorganization. 89 They can be used to present a fait accompli to both
creditors and to the judge. 90 Where this is the case, the RSA is an important
piece of the puzzle, limiting the ability of dissenting constituencies to
organize and/or raise objections. 91
V. RESTRUCTURING SUPPORT AGREEMENTS AND CHANGE
OF CONTROL: 363 SALES, JEVIC AND THE ICE CUBE BOND
Returning to the change of control transactions in bankruptcy, we must
consider RSAs in the context of the two alternative mechanisms for
effectuating a change of control in Chapter 11: (1) the sale of the company
pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization; and (2) the sale of the
company pursuant to an all-asset going concern sale under section 363(b).
As Janger and Jacoby have written, hurry-up all-asset sales under 363
are sometimes a necessary shortcut, where the debtor truly is a “melting ice
cube” and a quick sale is necessary to preserve its value. 92 Where this is the
case, the court must assure itself that crisis leverage is not being used to
undercut the Bankruptcy Code’s distributional scheme.
Just like 363 sales, RSAs are useful as long as their limits are
recognized. To the extent that an RSA ensures that a consensual sale can be
achieved and subjected to the consensual plan confirmation process, it is a
useful tool. To the extent that an RSA is used to prevent scrutiny of a
particular sale or modification to the distributional scheme it is problematic.
In the absence of a confirmed plan of reorganization, there should be a
87. For a recent example, see Erik Larson, Journal Register Approved to Sell Assets in
Bankruptcy Court, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2013, 5:23 PM), https://bloom.bg/2BCbovF.
88. Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727,
738 (2010); Jacoby & Janger, supra note 5, at 895.
89. E.g., In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983).
90. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 5, at 888–89.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 865.
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strong presumption in favor of distribution according to statutory priorities.
Accordingly, steps should be taken to assure that there are sufficient funds
retained to assure a distribution that is “fair and equitable.” This is a key
lesson from Jevic. One mechanism for accomplishing this would be to use
an “Ice Cube Bond,” setting aside a sufficient portion of the sale proceeds
to assure that distributions will comply with the cramdown standard of §
1129(b). While Jevic’s holding does not apply to 363 sales, per se, its
concern about end-runs applies equally.
In a recent working paper, Professor Douglas Baird has made a point
somewhat similar to ours. He lauds RSAs but warns that they should be
scrutinized for provisions that impede the flow of information to creditors
and the court. 93 Our point is broader. We, too, are concerned about
informational impediments, but our concerns extend to the impact RSAs
can have on the voting process itself, as well as to the distributional scheme.
Accordingly, we believe it is necessary not only to police the availability of
information, but also to police distortions to the distributional scheme
through procedural “end-runs.”
First, as noted, any provisions in an RSA that would deprive the
signatories of the ability to change their vote if completion of the disclosure
process revealed a material change or a better offer should be off limits.
This view is rooted in Jevic’s concern about procedural end-runs.
Second, Jevic demonstrates the link between procedure (the plan
confirmation process) and priority (the statutory waterfall). The link
between procedure and priority is reflected in what we believe is a central
norm of Chapter 11: no party may use procedural end-runs to leverage the
common good of value maximization into an individual benefit from
reordered priority. While the Code allows for bargaining against a backdrop
of entitlements, it does not allow for coercion that overrides the plan
process. For example, in the case of DBSD North America, Inc., a creditor
attempted to accumulate a blocking position to frustrate a plan in order to
force the debtor to enter into a strategic transaction with it. 94 The Second
Circuit upheld a designation of the creditor’s vote on the plan as not in good
faith because the creditor was attempting to extract a personal benefit,
rather than maximize the value of the estate or even benefit its class.95
Accordingly, in our view, deviations from statutory priority are
permissible only if:

93. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, U. OF CHI. COASE-SANDOR INST. FOR
L. & ECON. RES. PAPER NO. 755 (Apr. 15, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2767057.
94. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 104
(2d Cir. 2010).
95. Id.
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(1) the distribution is on account of new value contributed post-petition
that increases the overall value available for distribution without
reducing the distribution of any particular creditor; or
(2) when the procedural requirements of section 1129(a) are met.
This is the set of questions that judges must ask whenever they approve
critical vendor motions under section 363, settlements under section 363
and Rule 9019, debtor-in-possession financing agreements under section
364, curing of defaults under contracts under section 365, and structured
dismissals under Jevic. RSAs should be subject to the same sort of scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
When a company files for bankruptcy, it is in play. It can be purchased
by its creditors, by its old owners (after exposure to the market or a nonexclusive plan process), or by a third party. In such circumstances, the plan
confirmation process displaces the usual corporate governance machinery,
and must do so, given the inadequacy of fiduciary duties where the residual
claimant is uncertain. RSAs can be a useful tool in effectuating an orderly
and value maximizing change of control.
RSAs, however, must remain just that, a tool for effectuating the plan
process, rather than a substitute for it. Red flags arise when the RSA “locks
in” a particular purchaser, or where the RSA does allow exit in the event of
material change or a higher and better offer. Similarly, courts must be on
guard for provisions that might chill a higher and better offer. Red flags
also arise where the RSA seeks to “lock in” a particular distribution that
deviates from statutory priority in a way that will bind non-signatories.
Thus, RSAs should be scrutinized for such badges of opportunism to ensure
that they are not being used as an end-run around the electoral majorities
and substantive safeguards mandated by section 1129(a).
Where badges of opportunism are observed, the court has at its disposal
a number of tools, depending on how the issue arises. If the debtor seeks to
assume the RSA, or to enforce a milestone, then the court can condition its
approval. If the debtor has not assumed the RSA, then separate
classification, or designation of votes might be an appropriate remedy.
Where a sale is contemplated prior to confirmation, an Ice Cube Bond can
be used to facilitate completion of plan negotiations or compliance with the
statutory priority waterfall. Just as RSAs are a flexible tool, courts should
be alert, yet flexible, in how they are policed. But always they should be
measured with an eye toward whether they facilitate or frustrate the plan
process and whether they respect the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory
distributional scheme.

